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Abstract
The author develops the ﬁrst comparative empirical study of bank failures during the nineties
between East Asia and Latin America using bank-level data, in order to address the following two
questions: (i) To what extent did individual bank conditions explain bank failures? (ii) Did mainly
the weakest banks, in terms of their fundamentals, fail in the crisis countries? The main results for
East Asia and Latin America show that bank-level fundamentals not only signiﬁcantly affect the
likelihood of bank failure, but also account for a signiﬁcant proportion of the likelihood of failure
for failed banks. Systemic shocks (macroeconomic and liquidity shocks) that triggered the
banking crises mainly destabilized the weakest banks ex ante, particularly in East Asia. This
ﬁnding raises questions about regional asymmetries in the degree of banking sector resilience to
systemic shocks.
JEL classiﬁcation: G2, N2
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial institutions
Résumé
Il s’agit de la première étude empirique où l’on compare les défaillances bancaires survenues dans
les années 1990 en Asie orientale et en Amérique latine à la lumière de données recueillies au
niveau des banques. L’auteur tente de répondre à deux questions. Premièrement, dans quelle
mesure la défaillance d’une banque était-elle liée à sa situation ﬁnancière? Deuxièmement, les
banques défaillantes dans les pays en crise étaient-elles généralement les plus fragiles d’après
leurs indicateurs fondamentaux? Selon les principaux résultats obtenus pour ces deux régions,
non seulement les paramètres fondamentaux d’une banque ont une incidence signiﬁcative sur la
probabilité de faillite, mais ils expliquent une bonne partie de celle-ci dans le cas des banques
défaillantes. Les chocs systémiques (chocs macroéconomiques et de liquidité) qui ont déclenché
les crises bancaires ont surtout déstabilisé les banques les plus vulnérables a priori,
particulièrement en Asie orientale. Cette constatation amène à s’interroger sur la présence
d’asymétries régionales dans le degré de résilience du secteur bancaire face aux chocs
systémiques.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G2, N2
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Institutions ﬁnancières1.  Introduction 
 
In the past two decades, developed and developing countries have experienced significant 
episodes of systemic banking crises, which have been more costly, in terms of fiscal 
costs, in developing areas than in industrial economies; thus, the prevention of such 
recurrent episodes has become a priority of policy.
1 The most acute among the recent 
experiences were the financial and banking problems in some emerging markets (EMs) 
during the nineties, which renewed interest in academic and policy circles regarding the 
role that individual bank weaknesses, in terms of their fundamentals, play in contributing 
to bank failures. Even though there is an extensive theoretical literature on bank failures, 
however, there is no systematic cross-country empirical evidence using bank-level data 
on EMs to assess the role of bank-level fundamentals.
2 Most studies that analyze bank 
failures at the bank level focus on the experience of the U.S. commercial banking 
industry, even though most of the recent episodes of systemic banking crises have not 
occurred in developed countries. In this context, this paper contributes to the literature by 
developing the first comparative empirical study using bank-level data that take into 
account the recent episodes of systemic banking crises in East Asia and Latin America, in 
order to address the following two questions: (i) To what extent did individual bank 
conditions explain bank failures? (ii) Did mainly the weakest banks, in terms of their 
fundamentals, fail in the crisis countries? 
 
To address these questions, this paper studies the episodes of systemic banking crises in 
Latin America (Argentina, 1995; Mexico, 1994; and Venezuela, 1994) and East Asia 
(Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,  the Philippines, and Thailand in 1997) by gathering 
information  from balance sheets and income statements on an annual basis for 14 EMs 
from the Bankscope database and countries’ financial supervisory agency reports (eight 
East Asian countries: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan; and six Latin American countries: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela). The time span of the data covers the years from 1994 to 
1999 for East Asia and from 1992 to 1996 for Latin America. First, I estimate the 
individual probabilities of bank failure as a function of bank-level fundamentals related to 
solvency, liquidity, profitability, and asset quality using cross-sectional multivariate logit 
models to assess whether bank-level heterogeneity is important for explaining cross-
country differences in bank failures (i.e., whether crisis countries had weaker banks ex 
ante than non-crisis countries, rather than just having worse shocks ex post). Second, 
based on the estimated  individual probabilities of bank failure (propensity scores), I 
analyze their distribution for failed and non-failed banks in the crisis countries, 
evaluating the degree of overlap  between the distribution of both groups to assess 
                                                 
1 See Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). I follow the definition of systemic banking crises given by 
Sundararajan and Baliño (1991): “financial crisis is defined as a situation in which a significant 
group of financial institutions have liabilities exceeding the market value of their assets, leading 
to runs and other portfolio shifts, collapse of some financial firms, and government intervention.” 
 
2 Some exceptions that study banking crises in EMs using bank-level data are Gonzalez-
Hermosillo (1999), Bongini, Claessens, and Ferri (2001), and Rojas-Suarez (2001). 
   2 
whether mainly the weakest banks failed in those countries. I also compute the average of 
the propensity scores for failed and non-failed banks, to determine the relative 
contribution of only bank-level fundamentals to the likelihood of failure.
 3 
 
The results for East Asia and Latin America show that bank-level fundamentals not only 
significantly affect the likelihood of bank failure, but also explain a high proportion of 
the likelihood of failure for failed banks (between 50 and 60 per cent). I find regional 
differences when I analyze the distribution of the estimated probabilities of failure. The 
results for East Asia show that in the crisis countries there is little overlap in the 
distribution of propensity scores between failed and non-failed institutions. This result 
suggests that systemic shocks—macroeconomic  and liquidity shocks—mainly 
destabilized and put in distress the weakest banks ex ante, in terms of their fundamentals. 
The results for Latin America, however, show a significant overlap in the distribution of 
propensity scores between failed and non-failed banks in the crisis countries, which 
suggests that a fraction of relatively non-weak banks ex ante may have been forced to fail 
in the context of unexpected aggregate shocks to the system. When I take into account, 
through a survival time analysis, the effect of banking system and macroeconomic 
variables over the time of the crisis period, I find that the failure threshold of this group 
of relatively non-weak banks ex ante was shifting over the period, which explains the 
quality difference between failed and non-failed banks in Latin America.  
 
This paper’s main contributions to the literature are as follows. First, the paper extends 
and complements existing empirical studies, which focus mainly on macroeconomic 
factors at the origin of crisis, by identifying and comparing underlying patterns of 
individual bank conditions not only across countries but also across regions using bank-
level data. Second, this paper evaluates the relevance of using traditional CAMEL
4-type 
variables as indicators of near-term bank vulnerability for EMs, which have been applied 
mainly by developed economies. Third, the paper’s results point towards further research 
on the role regional asymmetries play in the degree of banking sector resilience to 
systemic shocks (macroeconomic and liquidity shocks); i.e., whether the banking sector 
in Latin America is less able to withstand or absorb unexpected systemic shocks than the 
banking sector in East Asia. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related theoretical 
and empirical literature on banking crises. Section 3 describes the data sources and 




                                                 
3 Average propensity scores are calculated as the average of the individual estimated probabilities 
of bank failure for the group of failed and non-failed banks across crisis and non-crisis countries. 
  
4 CAMEL stands for Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings and profitability, 
and Liquidity.   3 
2.  Review of Related Literature 
 
Gavin and Hausmann (1996) argue that systemic shocks undermine the viability of banks 
and create a crisis, but they do not completely explain banking crises. Bank failures result 
from the interaction of vulnerability and systemic shocks, where the weakest banks are 
the ones most likely to fail.
5 In their argument, “a bank is vulnerable when relatively 
small shocks to income, asset quality, or liquidity make the bank either insolvent or 
illiquid so that its ability to honor short term debt is brought into doubt” (p. 48). Banks 
become vulnerable because of bad managerial practices, reflected in the deterioration of 
banks’ portfolio and capital structures before the onset of the crisis. According to Gavin 
and Hausmann, systemic shocks associated with macroeconomic or liquidity shocks play 
an important role in triggering a crisis by putting stress on insolvent and/or illiquid banks 
(i.e., systemic shocks push mainly the weakest banks ex ante to fail).  
 
Chinn and Kletzer (2000) and Dekle and Kletzer (2001) provide theoretical models of 
financial crises in EMs where the source of the crises is the interaction between the 
microeconomics of private financial intermediation and government macroeconomic 
policies. The emphasis on the vulnerability of the banking sector bears much in common 
with the description and analysis of the East Asian crisis by Corsetti, Pesenti, and 
Roubini (1998). Their model is based on agency problems in the domestic financial 
intermediation of international capital flows that originate in an informational advantage 
for domestic banks in domestic intermediation, and government provision of guarantees 
and insurance. Within this framework, banks intermediate lending to firms that are 
subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks, implying that firms will become insolvent 
with positive probability, in which event banks have the incentive to renegotiate a firm’s 
debt. Banks not only accumulate increasingly risky assets, but also become progressively 
more indebted through foreign borrowing; under implicit guarantees, this constitutes a 
contingent liability for the government. In this context, the crisis evolves endogenously as 
banks become increasingly fragile, not only because of portfolio deterioration but also 
because of the reduction of the total equity value of the banking sector, in absolute terms 
and in proportion to the equity value of the borrowing firms. 
 
Most of the empirical studies that try to identify the nature and origins of systemic 
banking crises in EMs focus mainly on macroeconomic factors and institutional 
variables.
6 The majority of empirical studies on banking failures that use bank-level data 
                                                 
5 Oviedo (2003) presents a theoretical model where bank failures are due exclusively to 
macroeconomic shocks; there is no relative deterioration of banks’ portfolios and capital 
structures before the aggregate productivity shock. 
 
6 See Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998), Radelet and Sachs 
(1998), and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 1999, and 2002). Some of the explanatory 
variables used in these studies are the rate of growth of GDP per capita, the change in terms of 
trade, the rate of change of the exchange rate, the real interest rate, the rate of change of the GDP 
deflator, the ratio of the central government budget surplus to GDP, the ratio of M2 to the foreign 
exchange reserves of the central bank, the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP, 
the ratio of bank liquid reserves to bank assets, the rate of change of the ratio of bank assets to   4 
focus mainly on the U.S. commercial banking industry. Among the contributions in the 
past decade, Thomson (1991), Whalen (1991), Cole and Gunther (1995, 1997), and 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) develop empirical analyses of the contribution of bank 
fundamentals and of systemic and macroeconomic factors in different episodes of 
banking system problems in the United States: Southwest (1986–92), Northeast (1991–
92), and California (1992–93). The common methodologies used by these authors are 
multivariate logit analysis and proportional hazard models; their main findings are that 
measures of bank solvency and risk, proxied by CAMEL-rating variables, explain the 
incidence of bank failures after controlling for aggregate factors.
7 Calomiris and Mason 
(2000) provide the first comprehensive econometric analysis of the causes of bank 
distress during the Great Depression. They construct a model of survival time and 
investigate the adequacy of bank fundamentals (measures of bank solvency and risk, 
related to the CAMEL-rating system) for the period 1930–33, after controlling for the 
effects of county, state, and national-level economic characteristics. They find that bank 
fundamentals explain most of the incidence of bank failure and argue that “contagion” or 




To date, however, there is no systematic cross-country empirical evidence that evaluates 
the relative contribution of bank-level fundamentals in the context of the recent systemic 
banking crises in EMs during the nineties. The main contributors to the literature of bank 
failures in EMs using bank-level data are Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999), Bongini, 
Claessens, and Ferri (2001), and Rojas-Suarez (2001). 
 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) analyzes the role of bank-level fundamentals and 
macroeconomic factors for the Mexican banking crisis of 1994–95. She finds that all ex 
post measures of risk, and the loan-to-assets ratio, are associated with the probability and 
timing of failure. Bongini, Claessens, and Ferri (2001) investigate the occurrence of bank 
distress (i.e., whether the financial institution was recapitalized by the government, 
received liquidity support, was merged or acquired by another institution, or was 
intervened or closed by the government) and closure decisions in five East Asian 
                                                 
GDP, a dummy variable for the presence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme, and an index of 
the quality of law enforcement. One exception is Honohan (1997), who performs a systematic 
evaluation of alternative indicators based on aggregate balance sheet indicators and indicators of 
macro cycles: the ratio of loans to deposits, the ratio of foreign borrowing to deposits, the growth 
rate of credit, the share of reserves to deposits, level of lending to the government, and level of 
central bank lending to the banking system. 
 
7 Earlier researchers are Sinkey (1975), Martin (1977), Barth et al. (1985), and Benston (1985). 
These authors seek to identify changes in bank-specific variables, related to the CAMEL-rating 
analysis, that lead to bank difficulties, and that therefore could be part of an early-warning system 
of banking problems. 
 
8 Calomiris and Mason (1997) analyze the banking failures during the Chicago panic of June 
1932 using a methodology they again use in their paper of 2000. They conclude that failures 
during the panic reflected the relative weaknesses of failing banks in the face of a common asset-
value shock, rather than contagion.   5 
countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) in order to assess 
the role of both banks’ “connections”—with industrial groups or influential families—
and banks’ micro-weaknesses in causing and resolving bank failures. Among their main 
findings, CAMEL-type variables, such as the ratios of loan-loss reserves to capital and of 
net interest income to total income, help predict subsequent distress; and “connections” 
increase the probability of distress and make closure more likely. Rojas-Suarez (2001) 
evaluates an alternative set of indicators based on “markets that work,” rather than simply 
relying on accounting figures (CAMEL-type variables), in order to identify in advance 
impending banking problems. She finds, using bank-level data for six EM countries 
(Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela) and applying the 
“signal-to-noise approach” methodology used in the study of currency crises by 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), that the capital-to-asset ratio has performed poorly as an 
indicator of banking problems in Latin America and East Asia. On the other hand, 
interest rates on deposits and spreads have proven to be strong performers. 
 
While extremely informative, the first two of these studies (Gonzalez-Hermosillo 1999 
and Bongini, Claessens, and Ferri’s 2001) have three limitations as far as the objectives 
of this paper are concerned. First, case studies are interesting in their own right. One of 
my major goals, however, is to find common ground across different episodes of 
systemic banking crises; i.e., to find systematic underlying patterns that will allow me to 
make comparisons not only across countries but also across regions (Latin America and 
East Asia) about the relative contribution of bank-level fundamentals to the recent 
episodes of systemic banking crises. Policy-makers and financial regulators could use this 
information to develop a set of indicators of financial soundness in order to assess 
banking systems’ strengths and vulnerabilities.  
 
Second, Bongini, Claessens, and Ferri’s (2001) analysis of the probability of distress does 
not include non-crisis countries in East Asia, which could introduce a bias in the results, 
in that crisis countries had more bank failures simply because they were affected by 
adverse aggregate shocks and not because of differences in ex ante bank fundamentals 
(crisis countries had weaker banks ex ante than non-crisis countries). Also, only a limited 
number of bank-level fundamentals are included in their estimation, not taking into 
account relevant measures such as the capital-to-assets ratio, the loans-to-assets ratio, and 
measures of liquidity. This also could introduce a bias, because not all sources of risk 
(market, credit, and liquidity) have been represented. Their definition of distress includes 
institutions that were merged or acquired by other financial institutions. Mergers and 
acquisitions, however, could be due to strategic reasons, rather than distress. In that 
sense, it is necessary to check the robustness of the results to the exclusion of their 
definition of distress.  
 
Third, neither Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) nor Bongini, Claessens, and Ferri (2001) 
calculate the relative contribution of bank-level fundamentals to the probability of bank 
failure, or assess whether mainly the weakest banks in terms of their fundamentals failed 
during the crisis. 
   6 
3.  Data Description 
 
In the case of East Asia,
9 financial statements for a sample of 444 banks have been 
gathered from Bankscope, a comprehensive database of balance sheet and income 
statement data for individual banks across the world. This information covers the period 
1995–99 on an annual basis. Bankscope collects annual reports and financial statements 
from individual banks, which are prepared according to the various national accounting 
standards, and adjusts the reported data to make them as comparable as possible across 
countries.  
 
The breakdown of data by countries is as follows: (i) 86 commercial banks and 3 other 
financial institutions in Indonesia,
10 (ii) 27 commercial banks and 28 other financial 
institutions in Korea, (iii) 41 commercial banks and 33 other financial  institutions in 
Malaysia, (iv) 31 commercial banks and 5 other financial institutions in the Philippines, 
(v) 15 commercial banks and 26 other financial institutions in Thailand, (vi) 43 
commercial banks and 96 other financial institutions in Hong Kong, (vii) 18 commercial 
banks and 39 other financial institutions in Singapore, and (viii) 36 commercial banks 
and 10 other financial institutions in Taiwan. 
 
Coverage of the national financial sector in terms of total assets is high for all five East 
Asian crisis countries, and substantial in terms of the number of commercial banks for 
Malaysia and Thailand. In terms of total assets, the coverage of the total commercial 
banking system in my sample varies between 80 per cent and 100 per cent. The coverage 
of other financial institutions is between 47 per cent and 90 per cent. The coverage in 
terms of the number of commercial banks (local and foreign) is 35 per cent in Indonesia, 
34 per cent in Korea, 100 per cent in Malaysia, 63 per cent in the Philippines, and 100 per 
cent in Thailand. In the case of other financial institutions, the coverage is 3 per cent in 
Indonesia, 49 per cent in Korea, 55 per cent in Malaysia, 5 per cent in the Philippines, 
and 27 per cent in Thailand. 
 
In the case of Latin America, I assemble a database by gathering annual balance sheets 
and income statements for a sample of 307 banks for crisis countries (Argentina, Mexico, 
and Venezuela), as well as for non-crisis countries (Chile, Colombia, and Peru) for the 
period 1992–96.
11 The coverage of the financial information in terms of total assets is 
                                                 
9 In East Asia, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand are the crisis countries, 
and Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan are the non-crisis countries. 
 
10 Other financial institutions include finance companies in the case of Thailand; savings and 
investment banks and merchant banks in the case of Korea and Malaysia; savings banks in the 
case of the Philippines; and Islamic and investment banks in the case of Indonesia. 
 
11 Bankscope does not report financial information for banks that failed in Argentina, Mexico, 
and Venezuela during their respective crisis periods. For this reason, balance sheets and financial 
statements have been gathered separately for each crisis country from financial regulatory 
agencies. In this context, the coverage in terms of commercial banks is 100 per cent. For non-
crisis countries, the information is obtained from Bankscope.   7 
over 80 per cent for all the countries, because the banking sector covers a very high share 
of the financial system in Latin American countries. As of the end of 1994, the coverage 
in terms of total assets is 98 per cent in Argentina, over 80 per cent in Mexico, and 84 per 
cent in Venezuela. The breakdown of data by countries is as follows: (i) 171 commercial 
banks in Argentina, (ii) 27 commercial banks in Chile, (iii) 21 commercial banks in 
Colombia, (iv) 20 commercial banks in Mexico,
12 (v) 21 commercial banks in Peru, and 
(vi) 47 commercial banks in Venezuela.
13 
3.1  Description of the variables 
 
Theoretical models that stress the role of bank-level fundamentals in instigating failures 
(Chinn and Kletzer 2000 and Dekle and Kletzer 2001) establish that, as a consequence of 
bad management, the probability of failure is an increasing function of bank asset risk 
and solvency (leverage). Chang and Velasco (1999, 2001) stress the role of bank 
liquidity. Bank-level variables that proxy for bank asset risk, liquidity, and solvency are 
thus needed in this analysis.  
 
According to Sinkey (1975), bank financial ratios reflect the variation in bank asset risk 
and leverage, because they capture the market, credit, operational, and liquidity risk faced 
by banks. In this sense, bank balance sheets and income statements convey information 
about the ex post consequences of management’s decisions (i.e., they provide an indirect 
measure of managerial performance).  
 
The financial ratios used extensively in the empirical literature on the U.S. commercial 
banking industry are those related to the CAMEL rating system. Regarding asset risk, 
ratios of loan-loss reserves and loan-loss provisions over both total loans and capital are 
ex post measures of asset quality, and the ratio of total loans to total assets represents an 
ex ante measure of asset risk.
14 All of these ratios are expected to be positively related to 
the risk of bank failure. Bank profitability is also considered an ex ante measure of asset 
risk  (FDIC 1997). Sustained levels of profitability allow the financial institution to 
                                                 
12 As of the end of 1994, there were 32 banks in Mexico. However, 12 banks report information 
only since 1994. For this reason, I take only banks that have at least one year of information 
previous to September 1994. 
 
13 See Appendix C for a detailed description of the data set, and Appendix F for a list of failed 
banks used in the estimations. 
 
14 T he ratio of non-performing loans over total loans is another traditional measure of asset 
quality, but it is not used here because it cannot be found consistently for all the selected 
countries, and because this measure varies widely across countries due to different accounting 
standards. On the other hand, ratios of banks’ portfolio concentration, which are related to ex ante 
bank asset risk, are not included due to data availability constraints. 
   8 
increase its capital base and improve its viability, so profitability is negatively related to 
the risk of bank failure.
15 
 
Solvency is related to the ability to withstand shocks (i.e., how well a financial institution 
can absorb losses). An operative concept of solvency (positive net worth) is difficult to 
measure in practice,  however,  because the presence of non-marketable assets or the 
absence of liquid markets for some categories of bank assets make it difficult to obtain a 
consistent measure of a bank’s asset value. In this context, solvency has been proxied by 
the extent of leverage, where the ratio of total capital (total equity plus loan-loss reserves) 
over total assets is the traditional measure of solvency used in the empirical literature.
16  
 
Two additional measures of bank solvency are introduced: the ratio of total capital (i) 
over total liabilities, and (ii) over total liabilities plus  off-balance-sheet items. The 
measure of the extent of leverage using liabilities instead of assets provides a more 
sensible measure of the bank’s buffer stock that will serve as a cushion to absorb losses, 
particularly since the latest banking crises involved not only shocks to bank assets, but 
also to the deposit base. In addition, the explicit inclusion of off-balance-sheet positions 
produces a more accurate measure of bank leverage and exposure (Breuer 2000). 
Moreover, this measure accounts for the fact that, as Sundararajan et al. (2002, 15) point 
out, “the rapid unwinding of positions, as all counter parties run for liquidity, is 
characterized by creditors demanding payment, selling collateral, and putting on hedges, 
while debtors draw down capital and liquidate other assets. This can result in extreme 
market volatility.” All these alternative measures of solvency are negatively related to the 
risk of bank failure. 
 
Regarding liquidity risk, the traditional indicator of bank liquidity is the ratio of liquid 
assets (cash and reserves, government bonds, and other marketable securities) over total 
assets as a measure of the maturity structure of the asset portfolio, which can reflect 
excessive maturity mismatches. On the other hand, given that liquid assets allow banks to 
meet unexpected deposit withdrawals, the liquidity of assets relative to liabilities is also a 
factor that affects the risk of bank failure (Calomiris and Mason 2000). For this reason, 
both ratios, which are negatively related to the risk of bank failure, are included in the 
empirical analysis. 
 
Even though the existing theoretical literature does not consider bank size, measured by 
total assets, as a bank-level fundamental, it is included in my analysis to account for the 
fact that larger banks are better able to diversify their loan portfolio, thus reducing their 
                                                 
15 Exceptionally risky projects, however, could be associated with huge rates of return, so it is 
possible that, for some threshold, a high degree of profitability could be associated positively with 
the risk of failure (Gonzalez-Hermosillo, Pazarbasioglu, and Billing 1997). 
 
16 In particular, the risk-adjusted capital-asset ratio has been the traditional proxy for solvency. In 
1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision established a minimum standard of 8 per cent 
for this ratio. 
   9 
asset risk  (Calomiris and Mason  2000).
17 I also include bank ownership (foreign 
ownership) as an additional bank-level characteristic. Foreign banks are perceived as 
more stable and  safer than domestic banks, because they may be able to resort to 
upstream financing from the mother institutions, which could contribute to stabilize the 




Finally, because I am working with a cross-country sample, differences in the regulatory 
and institutional environment have to be taken into account. For that reason, I include a 
country indicator based on the variables of  La Porta et al. (1998), which account for 




The use of financial ratios as proxies for fundamental bank attributes provides 
information about the symptoms rather than the causes of financial difficulty, in that they 
provide leading indicators of incipient crisis (Sinkey 1979). As a result, I focus on the 
near-term fragility (vulnerability) of the banks, and not on medium-to-longer-term 
vulnerabilities, which requires the identification and evaluation of potential structural 
weaknesses that can affect incentives to screen and monitor risks. At the operational 
level, this involves a review of the institutional structure, the legal and regulatory system, 
corporate governance, the nature of implicit and explicit guarantees, and the effect of 
financial reform or liberalization (Johnston, Chai, and Schumacher 2000). 
 
 
4.  Methodology and Empirical Evidence 
 
Recall that this paper addresses two questions: (i) To what extent did individual bank 
conditions explain bank failures? (ii) Did mainly the weakest banks, in terms of their 
fundamentals, fail in the crisis countries? After providing a definition of failure, I 
evaluate whether bank-level heterogeneity is important for explaining cross-country bank 
failures (i.e., whether crisis countries had weaker banks ex ante than non-crisis countries, 
rather than simply having worse shocks ex post) by implementing mean tests on bank-
level fundamentals and estimating the probability of bank failure using a cross-sectional 
                                                 
17 Also, “too-big-to-fail” policies could extend the survival time (reduce the probability of failure) 
of larger banks. Care is required with this interpretation, however, because bank size is not the 
only element involved in a “too-big-to-fail” policy; a measure of the bailout or the perception of 
bailout should also be considered. 
 
18 No foreign bank failed in the banking crises in East Asia and Latin America during the nineties. 
However, there was limited foreign bank participation in both regions before the onset of the 
crises, particularly in East Asia.  
 
19 This indicator is constructed by taking the arithmetic average of the values for each of the 
considered variables. A higher value of the indicator implies a much better regulatory and 
institutional environment. See Appendix B for the calculation. 
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multivariate logit model for East Asia and Latin America separately, including crisis and 
non-crisis countries. I then evaluate, based on the individual estimated probabilities of 
failure (propensity scores), the degree of overlap between the distribution of propensity 
scores of failed and non-failed banks in the crisis countries to assess whether mainly the 
weakest banks failed during the crisis period. In addition, I compute the average of the 
propensity scores for failed and non-failed banks, to determine the relative contribution 
of bank-level fundamentals to the likelihood of failure.  
4.1  Definition of failure 
 
Most empirical studies on banking failures consider a financial institution (bank) to have 
failed if it either received external support or was directly closed. In this paper, a 
financial institution will be considered to have failed if it fits into any of the following 
categories (Bongini, Claessens, and Ferri 2001; Gonzalez-Hermosillo 1999):  
 
(i)  the financial institution was recapitalized by either the central bank or an agency 
specifically created to address the crisis, and/or required a liquidity injection from 
the monetary authority; 
(ii)  the financial institution’s operations were temporarily suspended (“frozen”) by the 
government; 
(iii)  the government closed the financial institution; 
(iv)  the financial institution was absorbed or acquired by another financial institution.  
 
These categories involve a broader concept of economic failure than the more restrictive 
concept of de jure failure (closure). One potential limitation is that category (iv) could 
include banks that were merged or absorbed for strategic reasons during the crisis period, 




In the empirical analysis, a financial institution is considered to have failed if it fits into 
any of the above categories between 1997 and 1999 in the case of East Asia, between 
December 1994 and December 1996 in the case of Argentina and Mexico, and between 
January 1994 and December 1995 in the case of Venezuela.
21 Thirty-one per cent of the 
sample failed in East Asia and Latin America. 
 
 
                                                 
20 This classification was done by consulting central banks’ annual reports and reviewing daily 
newspapers, in particular the Asian Wall Street Journal from March 1997 to August 1999. In 
addition, the information was cross-compared with two alternative databases assembled by 
Bongini, Claessens, and Ferri (2001) and Laeven (1999). 
 
21 The crisis period is defined from the onset of the crisis (time T): January 1997 (East Asia), 
January 1994 (Venezuela), and December 1994 (Argentina and Mexico) to two years subsequent 
to the onset (time T+1 and T+2). 
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4.2  Characteristics of failed and non-failed banks  
 
I examine whether failed banks were similar ex ante to non-failed banks. In this context, 
mean tests of financial ratios are calculated separately prior to the onset of the crisis for 
both regions. Both CAMEL-type variables, which reflect the market, credit, operational, 
and liquidity risk faced by the banks, and market-based indicators (deposit interest rates 
and spreads), are analyzed. This analysis reveals only whether there were statistical 
differences between failed and non-failed banks; it does not isolate the contribution of 
particular variables to the probability or time of failure. 
 
Tables 1 and 2 report mean tests for differences in bank-level fundamentals between 
failed and non-failed banks over the two-year period prior to the onset of the crises for 
East Asia and Latin America, respectively. In the case of East Asia, Table 1 reports the 
results for the whole sample of banks and for commercial banks only; results are similar 
for both samples. The results suggest that failed banks showed early signs of vulnerability 
before the onset of the crisis. 
 
Regarding asset risk, failed banks showed a higher ratio of loan-loss reserves to total 
equity, and a higher ratio of loans to total assets, than non-failed banks (i.e., not only high 
lending but bad lending characterizes failed institutions).
22 With respect to solvency, 
failed banks showed a lower ratio of capital to total assets and total liabilities (even 
including off-balance-sheet items), with banks less able to absorb negative shocks given 
higher leverage. Regarding liquidity, failed banks showed a lower ratio of liquid assets to 
not only total assets but also to total liabilities, which made them less able to withstand 
unexpected deposit withdrawals. In addition, failed banks showed lower profitability 
(return on assets), which made them less able to increase their capital base and improve 
their viability. In the case of Latin America, the results in Table 2 resemble those for East 
Asia regarding asset risk, solvency, and profitability. Failed banks showed lower liquidity 
ratios than non-failed banks only in the period immediately before the onset of the crisis. 
 
Following Rojas-Suarez (2001), two additional measures of the riskiness of individual 
banks based on market prices rather than accounting figures are analyzed: (i) the effects 
of interest rates (for loans and deposits), and (ii) interest rate spreads on the probability of 
bank failure, because such prices are a direct measure of the risk of bank default 
(Calomiris and Mason 1997).
23 An aggressive bidding for deposits could be associated 
with a higher likelihood of bank failure, because depositors demand high rates from 
banks that they perceive as risky; i.e., depositors could have information about bank 
                                                 
22 The results, however, do not show statistical differences in the ratios of loan-loss provisions. 
This could reflect accounting problems related to lax standards for loan classification and loan- 
loss provisioning, which were exposed during and after the crisis.  
 
23 The spread equals the difference between the loan interest rate and the implicit deposit interest 
rate. The loan interest rate is calculated as the ratio between interest income and total loans. The 
deposit interest rate is calculated as the ratio between interest expenses and total deposits. 
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vulnerability not captured by CAMEL-type variables, which  would cause equilibrium 
deposit rates to be higher for institutions that depositors perceive as risky.  
 
The results in Table 2 indicate that, up to two years before the onset of the crisis, the 
implicit deposit interest rate (spread) was higher (lower) for failed banks than for non-
failed banks, whereas there were no statistical differences in the loan interest rate. In 
addition, the growth rate of real deposits was similar statistically for failed and non-failed 
institutions before the onset of the crisis. These facts would suggest that failed banks 
were bidding aggressively to attract deposits, which could also be consistent with a 
higher degree of risk-taking activities. Regarding spreads, Rojas-Suarez (2001) argues 
that narrow spreads should be interpreted differently in emerging markets than in 
industrial-country financial markets; in the latter, narrow spreads reflect efficiency, but in 
emerging markets they can indicate increased bank risk taking.  
 
In the case of Latin America, the results show that, in the pre-crisis period, the implicit 
deposit interest rate was higher for failed banks than for non-failed banks, whereas there 
were not statistical differences in the growth rate of deposits.
24 These results suggest that 
failed banks had to offer higher returns to obtain financing for high-risk-taking activities 
before the onset of the crisis. In addition, the results show no statistical differences in 
spreads for the whole sample,
25 but a higher implicit interest rate on loans for failed 
banks than for non-failed banks in the period prior to the onset of the crisis.  
 
4.3  Probability of failure: cross-sectional logit estimation 
 
A cross-sectional multivariate logit model using CAMEL-type variables (that proxy for 
bank-level fundamentals) is estimated.
26 The dependent variable takes the v alue of 1 if 
the financial institution is identified in any of the categories of failure during the periods 
specified in section 4.1. I use as explanatory variables CAMEL-type variables associated 
with asset quality (the ratio of loan-loss provisions to the total loans and the ratio of total 
loans to assets), solvency (the ratio of total equity to total assets or liabilities), liquidity 
(the ratio of liquid assets to total liabilities), and profitability (the return on assets). I also 
include the logarithm of total assets to proxy for the size of the financial institution, a 
dummy of foreign bank ownership, and a country index of the regulatory and institutional 
environment. CAMEL-type variables are measured as of the end of 1996 for East Asia 
                                                 
24 In the case of Venezuela, the rate of deposit growth was lower than the implicit deposit interest 
before the onset of the crisis, which implies a transfer problem (i.e., banks were transferring net 
resources to the depositors, reducing their profitability). See Gavin and Hausmann (1996). 
 
25 In the period preceding the onset of the crisis, spreads in Mexico and Venezuela are lower for 
failed banks than for non-failed banks, which is consistent with the results of Rojas-Suarez (2001) 
and supports the hypothesis that lower spreads reflect mainly risk-taking activities in the context 
of EMs. Spreads in Argentina, however, are higher for failed banks. 
 
26 See Appendix A (section A1) for details on the multivariate logit model. 
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(Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
Thailand), as of the end of 1993 for Venezuela, as of September 1994 for Argentina and 
Mexico, and as of December 1994 for Chile, Colombia, and Peru.
27 
 
Table 3 reports explanatory variables’ marginal effects in the cross-sectional multivariate 
logit model for East Asia. According to the results, higher capital relative to assets or 
liabilities (even including off-balance-sheet items) is negatively associated with the 
probability of failure. A  higher level of liquid assets relative to total liabilities and a 
higher return on assets reduce the probability of failure. A higher ratio of loans to total 
assets has a positive impact on failure. However, a measure of asset quality, loan-loss 
provisions over total loans, is not significant.
28 The latter suggests that lagging indicators 
of bank soundness are not good predictors of bank failures under lax standards for loan 
classification and loan-loss provisioning. In the East Asian crisis countries, loans were 
classified as bad loans only if they had been in arrears for six months or more, and banks 
would frequently restructure such loans to reduce the size of reported portfolio problems 
(Lindgren et al. 1999). The logarithm of total assets, a measure of size, is significant and 
has a negative sign, and the dummy of foreign ownership is significant and has a negative 
sign, which suggests that foreign banks—because they have much better risk-based 
management practices, capitalization, and access to parent funding—are able to reduce 
their probability of failure. Also, during times of crisis, foreign banks can provide an 
alternative location for deposits without involving capital outflows (i.e., foreign banks 
could have a much more stable deposit base). Finally, the indicator variable related to 
regulation has the expected sign (negative) and is significant, which implies that cross-
country differences in the regulatory and institutional framework are associated with the 
probability of individual bank failure.  
 
Table 4 reports results for Latin America, which resemble those obtained for East Asia; 
bank-level fundamentals have the correct sign and explain significantly the probability of 
failure. In addition, the size of the bank is negatively associated with the probability of 
failure, and the dummy of foreign ownership is significant and has a negative sign.
29 
                                                 
27 Non-crisis countries in East Asia (Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan) and Latin America 
(Chile, Colombia, and Peru) are included in the estimation, to examine the degree of overlap in 
bank-level fundamentals between crisis and non-crisis countries. In the case of Latin America, I 
perform a robustness check by including only Chile as a non-crisis country, given that Colombia 
and Peru were implementing structural reforms at that time. No significant qualitative differences 
arise. For this reason, results including Colombia and Peru are reported. 
 
28 In addition, an estimation using the ratio of loan-loss reserves to total loans was performed, and 
there were not qualitative differences. 
 
29 This result would support the “too-big-to-fail” hypothesis. This result, however, also could be 
related to the fact that larger banks are better able to diversify their loan portfolios, reducing their 
asset risk (Calomiris and Mason 2000). 
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In both regions, then, failed banks had particular characteristics prior to the onset of their 
respective systemic banking crises (i.e., bank-level heterogeneity is important for 
explaining the variation in failure rates).
31 From these results, however, I cannot conclude 
that all or almost all failed banks were observably weaker before the onset of the crisis 
(more vulnerable to negative asset-value shocks) than banks that survived the crisis. To 
address this issue, I analyze the distribution of propensity logit scores for failed and non-
failed banks.  
 
4.4  Distributional analysis of propensity scores  
 
I re-estimate the cross-sectional multivariate logit model described in section 4.3 without 
the effect of the country indicator of institutional environment, to analyze the distribution 
of individual estimated probabilities of failure (propensity scores). The aim is to evaluate 
the degree of overlap between the distribution of failed and non-failed banks in the crisis 
countries, in order to assess whether mainly the weakest banks failed during the crisis 
period.
32 In addition, based on the previous estimation results, the average of the 
                                                 
30 Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela embarked i n structural reforms at the 
beginning of the nineties, which makes it difficult to have a significant variation in the considered 
indicators between crisis and non-crisis countries. If I include only Chile in the group of non-
crisis countries, however, I obtain similar results regarding bank-level characteristics and the right 
sign for the regulation index, but marginal significance (see Appendix D, Table D.1). Chile could 
be considered the benchmark of success in terms of the implementation of structural reforms in 
Latin America. Alternatively, an estimate was made including country dummies, instead of the 
country indicator of institutional environment. There were no qualitative changes in bank-level 
fundamentals regarding the previous results (see Appendix D, Table D.2). 
 
31The previous results are based on a broad definition of failure that includes mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A), which could be done for strategic reasons and need not imply a form of 
failure. For this reason, I perform a sensitivity analysis that excludes from my broad definition of 
failure cases in which the financial institution was absorbed or acquired by another financial 
institution. The cross-sectional multivariate logit model for both regions shown in Tables 3 and 4 
is distorted, particularly those results related to asset risk, where a higher ratio of loan-loss 
provisions to loans is negatively associated with the probability of failure, in the East Asian case. 
For Latin America, the ratio of total loans to total assets is not significant and has the wrong sign, 
and the liquidity ratio and profitability variable are not significant (see Appendix E, Tables E.2 
and E.3). In addition, mean tests were performed between non-failed banks and banks that were 
M&A; the results show that there were statistical differences in measures of asset risk, solvency, 
liquidity, and profitability, which suggests that M&A banks had higher vulnerability than other 
non-failed banks (see Appendix E, Table E.1). All together, these results imply that being merged 
or acquired was part of a bailout policy, rather than a strategic decision, during the peak of the 
crisis period.  
  
32 To calculate the propensity scores, the cross-sectional multivariate logit estimation uses as 
explanatory variables CAMEL-type variables associated with asset quality (the ratio of loan-loss   15 
propensity scores is computed using only bank-level fundamentals for failed and non-
failed banks, to determine the relative contribution of bank-level fundamentals to the 
likelihood of failure. 
 
Table 5a shows three main results for East Asia. First, the average of the propensity 
scores for non-failed banks in crisis countries was higher than that for non-failed banks in 
non-crisis countries.
33 This result suggests that the differences in the regulatory and 
supervisory environment in crisis countries could have given “incentives” to bank 
managers for high-risk-taking activities relative to non-crisis countries.
34 Second, the 
average logit propensity score of failed banks in crisis countries was higher than that of 
non-failed banks in non-crisis countries; only bank-level fundamentals explain 60 per 
cent of the probability of bank failure. This result implies that there were many fragile 
banks with particular ex ante (before the onset of the crisis) characteristics that made 
them more vulnerable to failure ex post. Third, in the crisis countries, there is little 
overlap in the distribution of logit propensity scores between failed and non-failed banks, 
which would imply that mainly the ex ante weakest banks failed in the crisis countries. 
Table 5b reports that 20 per cent of the distribution of propensity scores for failed banks 
is below the 75th percentile value of the distribution of logit scores for non-failed banks. 
This result suggests that systemic shocks—macroeconomic and liquidity shocks—mainly 
destabilized and put in distress  the weakest banks ex ante, defined in terms of their 
fundamentals, which could reflect some degree of resilience in the banking sector. 
 
Table 5a also shows the distribution of the propensity scores for Latin America. As in the 
case of East Asia, the average of the propensity scores for failed banks in crisis countries 
was higher than that for non-failed banks in non-crisis countries; bank-level fundamentals 
explain 53 per cent of the probability of failure. However, the average of the propensity 
scores for non-failed banks in crisis countries was similar to that for non-failed banks in 
non-crisis countries.
35 Finally, there is a significant overlap in the distribution of 
                                                 
provisions to total loans and the ratio of total loans to assets), solvency (the ratio of total equity to 
total liabilities), liquidity (the ratio of liquid assets to total liabilities), and profitability (the return 
on assets). Also, the estimation includes the logarithm of total assets to proxy for the size of the 
financial institution, and a dummy for foreign bank ownership. 
 
33 The average degree of vulnerability for non-failed banks in crisis countries is even higher if the 
Philippines is removed from the sample of crisis countries. Among the crisis countries, the 
Philippines was less affected by the financial crisis in East Asia. 
 
34In addition, mean tests were performed on non-failed banks between crisis and non-crisis 
countries. Non-failed institutions in crisis countries showed lower capitalization, profitability, 
liquidity, and spreads, and a higher ratio of loans over total assets, than non-failed banks in non-
crisis countries up to two years before the onset of the crisis. This result suggests that non-failed 
banks in crisis countries had a higher degree of vulnerability than non-failed banks in non-crisis 
countries.  
 
35 In the case of Latin America, non-failed banks in crisis countries showed  similar ratios of 
capitalization, profitability, and liquidity, but a higher ratio of loans over total assets than non-
failed banks in non-crisis countries prior to the onset of the crisis. Non-failed banks in crisis   16 
propensity scores between failed and non-failed banks in the crisis countries. Table 5b 
reports that 35 per cent of the distribution of propensity scores for failed banks is below 
the 75th percentile value of the distribution of propensity scores for non-failed banks.  
 
A closer examination of the results for Latin America shows that the overlapping group 
(i.e., the group of failed banks that falls below the 75th percentile value of the distribution 
of logit propensity scores for non-failed banks) can be divided into two groups with 
different characteristics: one (covering 30 per cent of the banks in the overlapping group) 
where failed banks have a probability of failure of between zero and 0.3, and another 
(covering 70 per cent of the banks in the overlapping group) with failure probabilities 
between 0.3 and 0.47, where 0.47 is the 75th percentile value of the distribution of logit 
scores for non-failed banks. Tables 6a and b report that the first group of failed banks 
with the lowest probabilities of failure (between zero and 0.3) were in a much better 
position, in terms of their fundamentals, than the rest of the failed banks above the 25th 
percentile value of the distribution of logit scores for failed banks, and that they did not 
show significant differences relative to the group of non-failed banks. The group of failed 
banks with probabilities of failure between 0.3 and 0.47 had a lower ratio of total loans 
and a lower liquidity ratio than the rest of the failed banks above the 25th percentile value 
of the distribution of logit scores for failed banks.
36 This second group of failed banks, 
however, showed weaker bank-level fundamentals than the group of non-failed banks. In 
this sense, the second group of failed banks was in an intermediate zone between 
healthier and non-healthier banks before the onset of the crisis. 
 
This significant overlap would suggest that, in Latin America, systemic shocks during the 
crisis period not only destabilized and put in distress the weakest banks ex ante, but also 
the weakest banks non-ex ante, in terms of their fundamentals, particularly banks that 
were in an intermediate financial situation between ex ante healthier and ex ante non-
healthier banks. To determine whether macroeconomic and banking system variables 
associated with macroeconomic and liquidity shocks affected the probability of bank 
failure during the crisis period, a survival time model for Latin America is estimated, 
using the same set of bank-level variables, and including banking system and 
macroeconomic variables, which also could explain early and late bank failures during 
the crisis periods.
37  
                                                 
countries, however, had a higher average logit propensity score than non-failed banks in non-
crisis countries when only Chile was included in the group of non-crisis countries. 
 
36 Also, they showed a higher ratio of solvency and higher profitability, but were not significantly 
different from the rest of the failed banks above the 25th percentile value of the distribution of 
logit scores. 
 
37 Given that an exact record of the specific dates of each bank failure is available, each financial 
institution’s monthly failure can be modelled as a function of bank-level fundamentals, banking 
system, and macroeconomic variables. The macroeconomic variables used in the estimation 
capture the effect of real exchange rate volatility and economic activity. The real exchange rate 
volatility is calculated as the  monthly average of the standard deviation of the real effective 
exchange rate reported by the International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund. 
Economic activity is proxied by GDP growth. The banking system variable used to proxy for   17 
The cross-sectional logit estimation, unconditional probability of failure, assumes that 
bank-level fundamentals (as of the end of 1993, September 1994, and December 1994) 
accurately reflect unchanging cross-sectional differences in bank conditions throughout 
the period January 1994–December 1995 for Venezuela, and December 1994–December 
1996 for Argentina and Mexico. This assumption might not be correct, however, because 
the crisis period in Latin America, as in East Asia, witnessed a continuous deterioration 
in asset values, implying that the failure threshold for banks was shifting over that period; 
i.e., declining fundamentals can explain the quality difference between early and late 
bank failures during the crisis periods (Calomiris and Mason 1997). This approach, the 




Table 7 reports that n ot only bank-level fundamentals, but also banking system and 
macroeconomic variables, explain significantly the timing of bank failure during the 
crisis period, and that coefficients of bank-level fundamentals related to asset quality 
(total loans over total assets), solvency, liquidity, size, and ownership are of the predicted 
sign and significantly explain the time of survival. Higher lending relative to assets is 
positively associated with the timing of failure. Moreover, higher capitalization (relative 
to assets and liabilities) is negatively associated with the timing of failure. In addition, 
higher liquid assets relative to total assets are negatively associated with the timing of 
failure, and larger banks are associated with longer survival, which could be consistent 
with the “too-big-to-fail” hypothesis; foreign ownership is negatively associated with the 
timing of failure, and the ex post measure of asset quality, the ratio of loan-loss 
provisions to total loans, is not significant. 
 
Regarding the banking system and macroeconomic variables, the measure of banking 
system liquidity, which could capture potential contagion effects, is positively associated 
with the bank survival time in all specifications (i.e., higher liquidity relative to deposits 
outside the bank gives positive spillovers, increasing the bank’s survival time). A higher 
volatility in the real effective exchange rate index is associated with a lower survival 
time. As expected, increases in the economic activity are positively associated with the 
time of survival. This result implies that declining bank-level fundamentals, given a  
deterioration in the economic environment, explain the quality difference between early 
and late bank failures during the crisis period in Latin America, where banks with weak 
fundamentals before the onset of the crisis failed at the beginning of the crisis period and 
                                                 
liquidity risk is based on Diamond and Rajan (2002), who argue that contagion effects could be 
caused not only by contractual or asymmetric information links, but also by bank failures that 
lead to a contraction in the common pool of liquidity; this negative spillover effect would raise 
the likelihood that other banks will fail. In this context, domestic liquidity risk is proxied by the 
total amount of liquidity relative to the total deposits outside the bank (i.e., the amount of cash in 
the vaults of the other banks in the system—the summation over the n-1 banks—over the total 
amount of deposits in the other banks in the system—the summation over the n-1 banks) as a 
measure of liquidity in the banking system.  
 
38 See Appendix A (Section A2) for a detailed description of the survival time model. 
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5.  Conclusions 
 
The results for East Asia and Latin America show that bank-level fundamentals not only 
significantly affect the likelihood of bank failure, but also explain a high proportion of 
the likelihood of failure for failed banks (between 50 and 60 per cent). These results 
support the view that failed banks in the systemic banking crises in EMs during the 
nineties suffered from fundamental weaknesses in their asset quality, liquidity, and 
capital structures prior to the onset of the crisis. Bank-level fundamentals, however, are 
not enough to explain cross-country differences in crisis outcomes. As shown by the 
survival time analysis, banking system and macroeconomic variables also explain the 
likelihood of failure. 
 
Regional differences appear in the distribution analysis of the estimated probabilities of 
failure. The results for East Asia show that, in the crisis countries, there is little overlap in 
the distribution of propensity scores between failed and non-failed institutions. This result 
suggests that systemic shocks—macroeconomic and liquidity shocks—mainly 
destabilized and put in distress the weakest banks ex ante, in terms of their fundamentals. 
The results for Latin America, however, show a significant overlap in the distribution of 
propensity scores between failed and non-failed banks in the crisis countries, which 
would suggest that a fraction of ex ante (before the onset of the crisis) relatively non-
weak banks may have been forced to fail in the context of unexpected aggregate shocks 
to the system. A survival time analysis of banking system and macroeconomic variables 
throughout the crisis period shows that the failure threshold of this group of ex ante 
relatively non-weak banks was shifting over the period; this result explains the quality 
difference between failed and non-failed banks in Latin America.  
 
These results point towards room for further research on the role regional asymmetries 
play in the degree of banking sector resilience to systemic shocks (macroeconomic and 
liquidity shocks); i.e., whether the banking sector in Latin America is less able to 
withstand or absorb unexpected systemic shocks than the banking sector in East Asia. 
Using banking system and macroeconomic variables, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) find 
that East Asia and Latin America have different regional patterns of banking crises. 
Systemic banking crises in Latin America have been more volatile and severe than those 
in East Asia. 
 
In terms of policy recommendation, these results suggest that financial system 
supervision in EMs could be strengthened by putting emphasis on traditional financial 
ratios associated with the CAMEL-rating system, at least as near-term indicators of bank 
vulnerabilities. The latter does not preclude the use of market-based indicators (e.g.,  
deposit interest rates and interest rate spreads) as indicators of bank  vulnerabilities, 
                                                 
39 Survival time was not analyzed for the East Asian case because of data limitations. In many 
cases, even when banks failed in 1998 or 1999, the database reports information only until 1996.    19 
forming the basis of an early-warning system of banking problems. In addition, these 
results stimulate discussion at the policy-maker level of the relevance of financial 
regulators disclosing information to build up a m ore effective market discipline as a 
component of the regulatory framework. Financial institutions should make general types 
of public disclosure, including the capital held as a buffer against losses, risk exposures 
(credit, market, and operational risks), risk assessment and management processes, and 
the capital adequacy of the institutions, in order to allow market participants (e.g., 
depositors) to assess the bank’s ability to absorb aggregate shocks and remain solvent. 
 
Given that macroeconomic and banking system variables affect the probability and 
timing of bank failure, banking regulation and supervision should also take into account 
the influence of macroeconomic developments on individual banks (i.e., assess the 
financial institution’s exposure to  systemic shocks)  in order to make the banking 
(financial) system more robust to systemic shocks. In this sense, it will not only be 
necessary to continue with the implementation of macro-prudential analysis in the 
context of banking supervision and the Financial System Assessment Programs (FSAPs), 
but also to reform the regulatory framework, ensuring that bank exposures to 
macroeconomic sources of risk are properly accounted for. This would include, for 
example, open positions in foreign currency, exposure to a particular economic sector, 
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Table 1:  Mean Tests for East Asia 
                        1 
I. Asset Quality 
a. Full  Sample 
2 
Dec. 1995 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed  Non-Failed  Failed 
Loan-loss provisions/Total equity  3.61  5.02***  3.66  4.85*** 
Loan-loss provisions/Total loans  0.54  0.64  0.52  0.56 
Loans/Total assets  58.00  67.14***  57.66  66.38*** 
*** indicates significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1 per cent level. 
b. Commercial Banks 
Dec. 1995 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed  Non-Failed  Failed 
Loan-loss provisions/Total equity  3.89  5.52***  3.55  5.15*** 
Loan-loss provisions/Total loans  0.55  0.67**  0.49  0.58* 
Loans/Total assets  61.09  68.95***  60.41  68.74*** 
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
II. Solvency 
a. Full Sample 
Dec. 1995 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed  Non-Failed  Failed 
Total equity/Total assets  12.73  9.79***  13.59  9.10*** 
Total equity/Total liabilities  13.62  10.96***  14.33  10.31*** 
Total equity/(Total liabilities + Off-balance-sheet items)  11.77  9.58***  12.59  8.82*** 
*** indicates significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1 per cent level. 
b. Commercial Banks 
Dec. 1995 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed  Non-Failed  Failed 
Total equity/Total assets  11.82  9.07***  12.25  8.59*** 
Total equity/Total liabilities  13.39  10.26***  13.31  9.62*** 
Total equity/(Total liabilities + Off-balance-sheet items)  11.26  8.75***  11.54  8.09*** 
(continued) 
*** indicates significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1 per cent level. 
1  
 The sample of countries for East Asia includes Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
   The sample of banks is divided between failed and non-failed banks. A financial institution (bank) is considered to have failed if 
    it fits into any of the following categories: (i) the financial institution was recapitalized by either the central bank or an agency specifically  
    created to address the crisis or by a strategic investor,  and/or required a liquidity injection from the monetary authority, (ii) the financial  
    institution’s operations were temporarily suspended (“frozen”) by the government, (iii) the government closed the financial institution, 
    and (iv) the financial institution was absorbed or acquired by another financial institution. 
2    Commercial banks and other financial institutions (finance companies, merchant banks, savings banks, and Islamic banks), totalling 
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Table 1:  Mean Tests for East Asia 
                        1  
            (continued) 
III. Liquidity 
a. Full  Sample 
2 
Dec. 1995 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed  Non-Failed  Failed 
Liquid assets/Total assets  21.08  17.63***  20.08  17.78*** 
Liquid assets/Total liabilities  23.49  19.52***  22.48  19.16*** 
*** indicates significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1 per cent level. 
b. Commercial Banks 
Dec. 1995 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed  Non-Failed  Failed 
Liquid assets/Total assets  23.47  18.81***  21.59  19.37* 
Liquid assets/Total liabilities  25.28  20.70***  23.83  21.15** 
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
IV. Earnings and Profitability 
A. Full  Sample 
Dec. 1995 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed  Non-Failed  Failed 
Net interest margin  3.49  3.42  3.58  3.32* 
Return on assets  1.53  1.04***  1.54  0.99*** 
*** and * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1 and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
b. Commercial Banks 
Dec. 1995 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed  Non-Failed  Failed 
Net interest margin  3.85  3.80  3.93  3.65 
Return on assets  1.48  1.03***  1.43  1.04*** 
*** indicates significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1 per cent level. 
V. Interest Rates and Deposits 
a. Full  Sample 
Dec. 1995 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed  Non-Failed  Failed 
Growth rate of deposits  11.53  18.85***  12.24  15.15 
Loans interest rate  14.33  14.63  14.41  15.25 
Deposit interest rate  8.24  10.34***  7.78  10.71*** 
Spread  6.42  4.92***  6.71  5.26*** 
*** indicates significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1 per cent level. 
b. Commercial Banks 
Dec. 1995 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed  Non-Failed  Failed 
Growth rate of deposits  16.47  17.48  16.34  16.86 
Loans interest rate  14.68  15.29  14.54  15.69* 
Deposit interest rate  7.53  10.26***  7.16  10.80*** 
Spread  6.48  4.94***  6.72  5.00*** 
*** and * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1 and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
1  
 The sample of countries for East Asia includes Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
   The sample of banks is divided between failed and non-failed banks. A financial institution (bank) is considered to have failed if 
    it fits into any of the following categories: (i) the financial institution was recapitalized by either the central bank or an agency specifically  
    created to address the crisis or by a strategic investor, and/or required a liquidity injection from the monetary authority, (ii) the financial  
    institution’s operations were temporarily suspended (“frozen”) by the government, (iii) the government closed the financial institution, 
    and (iv) the financial institution was absorbed or acquired by another financial institution. 
2  
 Commercial banks and other financial institutions (finance companies, merchant banks, savings banks, and Islamic banks), totalling 

















Table 2: Mean Tests for Latin America  
                    1     
Commercial Banks  
2,3 
I. Asset Quality 
T  -2  T -1 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed  Non-Failed  Failed 
Loan-loss provisions/Total equity  8.58  8.61  7.32  9.69* 
Loan-loss provisions/Total loans  2.05  1.35  1.92  1.70 
Total loans/Total assets  47.21  54.14***  48.62  55.46*** 
*** and * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1 and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
II. Solvency 
T  -2  T -1 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed  Non-Failed  Failed 
Total equity/Total assets  14.65  13.49  14.86  12.56** 
Total equity/Total liabilities  17.18  16.52  18.89  15.16** 
** indicates significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 5 per cent level. 
  
III. Liquidity 
T  -2  T -1 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed  Non-Failed  Failed 
Liquid assets/Total assets  23.99  22.29  24.13  20.33** 
Liquid  assets/Total liabilities  27.78  25.82  26.38  23.26* 
** and * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
IV. Profitability 
T  -2  T -1 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed  Non-Failed  Failed 
Return on assets  1.31  1.01  1.07  0.14*** 
*** indicates significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1 per cent level. 
V. Interest Rates and Deposits 
T  -2  T -1 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed  Non-Failed  Failed 
Growth rate of deposits  18.01  19.94  15.02  14.01 
Loans interest rate  18.32  23.89***  18.99  21.44** 
Deposit interest rate  9.92  12.02**  10.51  12.59* 
Spread  11.19  14.43***  11.42  13.97** 
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
1  
 The sample of countries for Latin America includes Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. 
2  
 The sample of financial institutions for Latin America includes only commercial banks because they cover a very high proportion (over 
    80 per cent) of the financial system in terms of assets. There are 307 commercial banks in the sample. 
   The sample of banks is divided between failed and non-failed banks. A financial institution (bank) is considered to have failed if 
    it fits into any of the following categories: (i) the financial institution was recapitalized by either the central bank or an agency specifically  
    created to address the crisis or by a strategic investor, and/or required a liquidity injection from the monetary authority, (ii) the financial  
    institution’s operations were temporarily suspended (“frozen”) by the government, (iii) the government closed the financial institution, 
    and (iv) the financial institution was absorbed or acquired by another financial institution. 
3  
  
T  -1 represents Dec. 93 for Venezuela, Sep. 94 for Argentina and Mexico, and Dec. 94 for Chile, Colombia, and Peru. T-2 represents     




Table 3: Cross-Sectional Logit Estimation for East Asia 
  1 
(Marginal Effects) 
         2 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Loan-loss provisions/Total loans  0.019  0.016  0.001 
0.615  0.696  0.980 
Total loans/Total assets  0.007 **  0.006 **  0.006 ** 
0.026  0.027  0.026 
Total equity/Total assets  -0.033 *** 
0.010 
Total equity/Total liabilities  -0.025 ** 
0.015 
Total equity/(Total liabilities + Off-Balance Sheet)  -0.019 * 
0.104 
Liquid assets/Total liabilities  -0.011 ***  -0.011 ***  -0.010 *** 
0.008  0.007  0.011 
Return on assets  -0.139 ***  -0.132 ***  -0.166 *** 
0.008  0.010  0.001 
Log (Total assets)  -0.235 ***  -0.229 ***  -0.166 *** 
0.000  0.000  0.000 
Foreign ownership  -0.855 ***  -0.841 ***  -0.897 *** 
0.000  0.000  0.000 
Regulation index  -0.070 ***  -0.070 ***  -0.075 *** 
0.004  0.003  0.003 
No. obs.  436  432  430 
Wald  Chi2  47.26  48.16  46.14 
Prob > Chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Overall predicted power  81.16%  80.61%  79.93% 
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, 
respectively. 
1   The estimation was done including crisis (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) and non-crisis 
   (Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan) countries.  The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the financial 
  institution (FI) fits into the definition of failure given in Table 1 during the period Jan. 97–Jun. 99, and zero otherwise. 
  Micro-level bank fundamentals, including the size of the FI, are measured as of December 1996. A constant term 
  was included in the initial estimation. 
2  
 Marginal effects are reported, rather than the coefficients.  The significance level is reported in italics below the 
  marginal effects. The Z-statistics are based on robust (Huber and White) standard errors, which account for correlated  
  observations in grouped data.   28 





Loan-loss provisions/Total loans 0.075 *** 0.076 ***
0.000 0.000
Total loans/Total assets 0.006 ** 0.006 **
0.032 0.044
Total equity/Total assets -0.016 ***
0.002
Total equity/Total liabilities -0.008 **
0.020
Liquid assets/Total liabilities -0.009 ** -0.010 **
0.024 0.022
Return on assets -0.066 ** -0.068 **
0.048 0.050
Log (Total assets) -0.068 *** -0.061 **
0.011 0.023
Foreign ownership -0.310 *** -0.317 ***
0.000 0.000
Regulation index 0.142 0.160
0.231 0.188
No. obs. 295 296
Wald  Chi2 36.91 36.12
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00
Overall predicted power 74.35% 74.56%
*** and ** indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1 and 5 per cent
level, respectively.
1  The estimation was done including crisis (Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela) and non-crisis (Chile, Colombia, and
  Peru) countries.  The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the financial institution (FI) fits into the
  definition of failure given in Table 1 during the period Jan. 94–Dec. 95 for Venezuela,  and Dec. 94–Dec.96 for 
  Argentina and Mexico; it is zero otherwise.
  Micro-level bank fundamentals, including the size of the FI, are measured as of December 1993 for Venezuela, as
  of September 1994 for Argentina and Mexico, and as of December 1994 for Chile, Colombia, and Peru. A constant
  term was included in the initial estimation.
2  Marginal effects are reported, rather than the coefficients.  The significance level is reported in italics below the 
  marginal effects. The Z-statistics are based on robust (Huber and White) standard errors, which account for 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6a: Mean Tests for Latin American Banks 
                                   1 
I. Asset Quality 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed (Group I)  Non-Failed  Failed (Group II) 
Loan-loss provisions/Total loans  1.66  1.69  1.66  1.10 
Total loans/Total assets  47.69  38.38*  47.69  59.72*** 
*** and * indicate significant differences between non-failed banks and failed banks (Group I) or between non-failed banks and failed banks  
(Group II) at the 1 and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
II. Solvency 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed (Group I)  Non-Failed  Failed (Group II) 
Total equity/Total assets  15.30  14.48  15.30  13.34 
Total equity/Total liabilities  20.40  19.16  20.40  16.59 
III. Liquidity 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed (Group I)  Non-Failed  Failed (Group II) 
Liquid assets/Total assets  27.45  33.84  27.45  20.11** 
Liquid assets/Total liabilities  33.51  43.27*  33.51  23.15*** 
***, **,  and * indicate significant differences between non-failed banks and failed banks (Group I) or between non-failed banks and failed 
banks (Group II) at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
IV. Profitability 
Variable  Non-Failed  Failed (Group I)  Non-Failed  Failed (Group II) 
Return on assets  0.97  0.81  0.97  0.55* 
* indicates significant differences between Non-Failed banks and Failed banks (Group II) at the 10 per cent level. 
1  
 The sample of countries for Latin America includes Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela. 
   Failed banks in group I include failed banks whose individual probabilities of failure are less than 0.3. 
   Failed banks in group II include failed banks whose individual probabilities of failure are between 0.3 and 0.47, where 0.47 is the 75th 
   percentile value of the distribution of estimated probabilities for non-failed banks.  35 per cent of the distribution of estimated probabilities 
   for failed banks is below that value (overlapping group).  
























Table 6b: Mean Tests for Latin America  
     1 
I. Asset Quality 
Variable  Failed (Group I)  Failed (Group III) Failed (Group II) Failed (Group III) 
Loan-loss provisions/Total loans  1.69  1.50  1.10  1.50 
Total loans/Total assets  38.38  71.32***  59.72  71.32*** 
*** indicates significant differences between failed banks (Group I) and failed banks (Group III) or between failed banks (Group II) and  failed  
banks (Group III) at the 1 per cent level. 
II. Solvency 
Variable  Failed (Group I)  Failed (Group III) Failed (Group II) Failed (Group III) 
Total equity/Total assets  14.48  11.91  13.34  11.91 
Total equity/Total liabilities  19.16  13.88  16.59  13.88 
III. Liquidity 
Variable  Failed (Group I)  Failed (Group III) Failed (Group II) Failed (Group III) 
Liquid assets/Total assets  33.84  18.19***  20.11  18.19 
Liquid assets/Total liabilities  43.27  20.53***  23.15  20.53 
*** indicates significant differences between failed banks (Group I) and failed banks (Group III) or between failed banks (Group II) and failed  
banks (Group III) at the 1 per cent level. 
IV. Profitability 
Variable  Failed (Group I)  Failed (Group III) Failed (Group II) Failed (Group III) 
Return on assets  0.81  -0.12*  0.55  -0.12*** 
*** and * indicate significant differences between failed banks (Group I) and failed banks (Group III) or between failed banks (Group II) and  
failed banks (Group III) at the 1 and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
1  
 The sample of countries for Latin America includes Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela. 
   Failed banks in group I include failed banks whose individual probabilities of failure are less than 0.3. 
   Failed banks in group II include failed banks whose individual probabilities of failure are between 0.3 and 0.47, where 0.47 is the 75th 
   percentile value of the distribution of estimated probabilities for non-failed banks.  35 per cent of the distribution of estimated probabilities 
   for failed banks is below that value (overlapping group).  
   Group I accounts for 30 per cent of the number of failed banks in the overlapping group and Group II accounts for the rest. 
   Failed banks in group III include failed banks whose individual probabilities of failure are higher than 0.47.   33 
 
Table 7: Survival Time Model for Latin America 
   1,2 
Estimation Period: 1994–96 (Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and Peru), 
                                  1993–95 (Venezuela). Annual data.              
(1)  (2) 
Loan-loss provisions/Total loans  -0.003  0.000 
0.955  0.999 
Total loans/Total assets  0.034 ***  0.036 *** 
0.001  0.000 
Total equity/Total assets  -0.026 ** 
0.012 
Total equity/Total liabilities  -0.020 *** 
0.004 
Liquid asset/Total liabilities  -0.031 *  -0.028 * 
0.056  0.084 
Return on assets  -0.046  -0.044 
0.453  0.490 
Log (Total assets)  -0.300 ***  -0.320 *** 
0.010  0.007 
Foreign ownership  -0.982 *  -0.970 * 
0.103  0.101 
Liquidity outside the bank  
3  -0.214 ***  -0.213 *** 
0.000  0.000 
Real exchange rate volatility 
4  0.244 **  0.253 ** 
   0.032  0.028 
GDP growth   -0.194 ***  -0.196 *** 
0.000  0.000 
No. obs.  885  888 
Wald  Chi2  60.99  67.72 
Prob > Chi2  0.00  0.00 
p -Weibull  
5  3.11  3.12 
1 
 The financial institution's time of failure is estimated by fitting a parametric (time-varying) Weibull distribution with 
  monotone hazard rates for the period 1996–99. The Huber-White robust estimator of variance is used to calculate 
  corrected standard errors. The table reports estimated coefficients. If the sign of the coefficient is positive (negative), 
  the variable is positively (negatively) associated with the financial institution's time of failure. 
2  
 The estimation includes crisis (Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela) and non-crisis (Chile, Colombia, and Peru) countries. 
3  
Total amount of liquidity relative to total deposits outside the bank; i.e., the amount of cash in vaults in the rest of  
  the banks in the system (the summation over the n -1 banks) over the total amount of deposits in the rest of the banks in  
  the system (the summation over the   n -1 banks). 
4  
The standard deviation of the monthly percentage variation of the real exchange rate index. 
5  
 An exponential distribution was not estimated because the maximum-likelihood estimator of p  in the Weibull function  
   is not close to 1.   34 
Appendix A: Description of the Logit and Survival Time Model 
A1.  Logit Model 
 
A qualitative response model is used to estimate the unconditional probability of the 
occurrence of distress as a function of a vector of explanatory variables, X, and a vector 
of unknown parameters, ?. The specific model is: 
Pr(Yi=1) = F[H(Xi, ?)], 
 
where Y is the dependent variable, which takes the value of one if the financial institution 
has experienced distress, and zero otherwise; 
 
F is the probability function, which has a logistic functional form, giving rise to the logit 
model: 
H  =  ?0 + Sj=1  ?j Xij; 
 
X is the vector of explanatory variables for the ith financial institution; and ? is the vector 
of parameters to be estimated. The basic equation of the logit model to be estimated can 
be written as: 
 













I use as explanatory variables CAMEL-type variables associated with asset quality (the 
ratio of loan-loss provisions to total loans and the ratio of total loans to total assets), 
solvency (the ratio of total equity to total assets or total liabilities), liquidity (the ratio of 
liquid assets to total liabilities), and profitability (return on assets). Also, I include the 
logarithm of total assets to proxy for the size of the financial institution, and a dummy of 
bank ownership. These variables are measured as of December 1996 for East Asia, 
September 1994 for Argentina and Mexico, December 1993 for Venezuela, and 
December 1994 for Chile, Colombia, and Peru. In addition, I include an indicator of the 
institutional environment, which varies by country. 
 
A2.  Survival Time Model  
 
Regarding the question of whether an event is likely to end the “next period,” the central 
concept is occupied not by the unconditional probability of an event taking place, but by 
its conditional probability. Survival time analysis allows the factors that explain the 
duration of a given state to be determined—in this case, the state of no distress. This 
duration is subject to random variations, and they form a distribution that is generally 
characterized by three mathematically equivalent functions: the survival function, the 
probability density function, and the hazard function. 
   36 
from the data. A particular case of the Weibull function is the exponential hazard in 
which p=1. 
 
The same set of bank-level fundamentals is used as in the cross-sectional logit estimation. 
In addition, I include a banking system variable, liquidity outside the financial institution, 
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Appendix B: Calculation of Regulation Index 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Rule of law  Corruption  Risk of expropriation  Risk of contract  Average 
repudiation  (1) - (4) 
Indonesia  3.98  2.15  7.16  6.09  4.38 
Korea  5.35  5.30  8.31  8.59  6.71 
Malaysia  6.78  7.38  7.95  7.43  7.71 
The Philippines  2.73  2.92  5.22  4.80  4.08 
Thailand  6.25  5.18  7.42  7.57  5.93 
Hong Kong  8.22  8.52  8.29  8.82  8.77 
Singapore  8.57  8.22  9.30  8.86  8.99 
Taiwan  8.52  6.85  9.12  9.16  8.08 
Std. Dev.  1.90 
Argentina  5.35  6.02  5.91  4.91  5.64 
Chile  7.02  5.30  7.50  6.80  6.77 
Colombia  2.08  5.00  6.95  7.02  5.66 
Mexico  5.35  4.77  7.29  6.55  5.99 
Peru  2.50  4.70  5.54  4.68  4.83 
Venezuela  6.37  4.70  6.89  6.30  6.15 
Std. Dev.  0.64 
Law and Finance (La Porta et al. 1998) 
Source of variables: International Country Risk Guide 
Description of variables: 
Rule of law: 
Assessment of the law-and-order tradition in the country produced by the country-risk 
rating agency International Country Risk (ICR). Average of the months of April and 
October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower 
scores for less tradition for law and order (La Porta et al. 1998 changed the scale of this  
variable from its original range from 0 to 6). 
Corruption: 
ICR’s assessment of the corruption in government. Lower scores indicate “high  
government officials are likely to demand special payments” and “illegal payments are 
generally expected throughout lower levels of government” in the form of “bribes 
connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, policy 
protection, or loans.” Average of the months of April and October of the monthly index 
between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for higher levels of 
corruption (La Porta et al. 1998  changed the scale of this variable from its original range 
from 0 to 6). 
Risk of expropriation: 
ICR’s assessment of the risk of “outright confiscation” or “forced nationalization.”  
Average of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. 
Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for higher risks. 
Risk of contract repudiation: 
ICR’s assessment of the “risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of a  
repudiation postponement or scaling down” due to “budget cutbacks, indigenization 
pressure, a change in government or a change in government economic and social 
priorities.” Average of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 
1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower scores for higher risks.   38 
Appendix C: Description of Data Set 
 
Table C.1: Bankscope Sample as of end of 1996: Overview of the Financial System 
Category   Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand 
Commercial 
banks 




3 (0)  28 (0)  33 (0)  5 (0)  26 (1) 
Total  89 (20)  55 (1)  74 (14)  36 (7)  41 (1) 
Numbers in () indicate the number of foreign-owned financial institutions. 
Source: Bankscope 
 
Table C.2: Coverage of the Bankscope Sample as of end of 1996: In Terms of Assets 
(%) 
Category   Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand 
Commercial 
banks 




58.0  58.7  62.5  60.2  89.6 
Source: Bankscope and countries’ central bank statistics 
 
Table C.3: Coverage of the Bankscope Sample as of end  of  1996: In  Terms of 
Number of Financial Institutions (%) 
Category   Indonesia  Korea  Malaysia  Philippines  Thailand 
Commercial 
banks 




3 (2%)  28 (49%)  31 (55%)  5 (5%)  26 (27%) 
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Table C.4: Sample Frequency Distribution of Failed Banks 
 
East Asia 
Category  Sample  Per cent 
Non-Failed  306  68.9 
Failed  138  31.1 




Category  Sample  Per cent 
Non-Failed  201  68.7 
Failed  96  31.3 




Table C.5: Distribution of Failed Banks across Crisis Countries  
 
East Asia 






















Category  Argentina  Mexico  Venezuela 
Failed  65  13  18 
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Appendix D: 
Table D.1: Cross-Sectional Logit Estimation for Latin America
1
Including only Chile in the non-crisis country group.
(Marginal Effects)2
(1) (2)
Loan-loss provisions/Total loans 0.095 *** 0.095 ***
0.000 0.000
Total loans/Total assets 0.005 * 0.004
0.096 0.127
Total equity/Total assets -0.016 ***
0.007
Total equity/Total liabilities -0.009 **
0.026
Liquid assets/Total liabilities -0.007 * -0.007 *
0.097 0.080
Return on assets -0.078 * -0.081 **
0.059 0.051
Log (Total assets) -0.056 * -0.052 *
0.061 0.078
Foreign ownership -0.329 *** -0.332 ***
0.000 0.000
Regulation index -0.246 * -0.221
0.083 0.119
No. obs. 253 254
Wald  Chi2 37.43 37.10
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00
Overall predicted power 72.77% 72.64%
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1, 5, and 10 per
cent level, respectively.
1 
 The estimation was done including crisis (Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela) and non-crisis (Chile, Colombia, and
  Peru) countries.  The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the financial institution (FI) fits into the
  definition of failure given in Table 1 during the period Jan. 94–Dec. 95 for Venezuela,  and Dec. 94–Dec.96 for 
  Argentina and Mexico; it is zero otherwise.
  Micro-level bank fundamentals, including the size of the FI, are measured as of December 1993 for Venezuela, as
  of September 1994 for Argentina and Mexico, and as of December 1994 for Chile, Colombia, and Peru. A constant
  term was included in the initial estimation.
2 
 Marginal effects are reported, rather than the coefficients.  The significance level is reported in italics below the 
  marginal effects. The Z-statistics are based on robust (Huber and White) standard errors, which account for 
  correlated observations in grouped data.    41 
Table D.2: Cross-Sectional Logit Estimation for Latin America
1
Using country dummies instead of regulation index.
(Marginal Effects)2
(1) (2)
Loan-loss provisions/Total loans 0.037 *** 0.035 ***
0.092 0.106
Total loans/Total assets 0.005 ** 0.005 **
0.046 0.054
Total equity/Total assets -0.012 ***
0.003
Total equity/Total liabilities -0.007 **
0.020
Liquid assets/Total liabilities -0.009 ** -0.010 **
0.004 0.002
Return on assets -0.110 ** -0.119 **
0.001 0.000
Log (Total assets) -0.078 *** -0.079 **
0.000 0.000
Foreign ownership -0.213 *** -0.218 ***
0.000 0.000
Argentina 0.667 *** 0.665 ***
0.000 0.000
Mexico 0.863 ** 0.863 **
0.050 0.049
Venezuela 0.911 ** 0.913 **
0.047 0.045
No. obs. 295 296
Wald  Chi2 36.66 36.96
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00
Overall predicted power 76.96% 76.32%
*** and ** indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1 and 5 per cent
level, respectively.
1  The estimation was done including crisis (Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela) and non-crisis (Chile, Colombia, and
  Peru) countries.  The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the financial institution (FI) fits into the
  definition of failure given in Table 1 during the period Jan. 94–Dec. 95 for Venezuela,  and Dec. 94 –Dec.96 for 
  Argentina and Mexico; it is zero otherwise.
  Micro-level bank fundamentals, including the size of the FI, are measured as of December 1993 for Venezuela, as
  of September 1994 for Argentina and Mexico, and as of December 1994 for Chile, Colombia, and Peru. A constant
  term was included in the initial estimation.
2 
 Marginal effects are reported, rather than the coefficients.  The significance level is reported in italics below the 
  marginal effects. The Z-statistics are based on robust (Huber and White) standard errors, which account for 
  correlated observations in grouped data.    42 
Appendix E: Robustness Check Excluding Mergers and Acquisitions of 
the Definition of Failure 
 
Table E.1: Mean Tests between Non-Failed Banks and Merged or Acquired Banks1
I. Asset Quality
East Asia Latin America
Variable Non-Failed M&A Non-Failed M&A
Loan-loss provisions/Total equity 3.66 4.90** 6.85 7.81
Loan-loss provisions/Total loans 0.61 0.54 1.76 1.08
Loan-loss reserve /Total equity 15.17 21.32**
Loan-loss reserves/Total loans 2.39 2.38
Total loans/Total assets 62.53 68.22* 53.37 69.23***
***, **, * indicate significant differences between non-failed and M&A financial institutions at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively.
II. Solvency
East Asia Latin America
Variable Non-Failed M&A Non-Failed M&A
Total equity/Total assets 13.77 8.37*** 19.78 15.24**
Total equity/Total liabilities 14.33 9.45*** 19.74 17.51
Total equity/(Total liabilities + Off-Balance-Sheet items) 12.33 8.24***
*** and ** indicate significant differences between non-failed and M&A financial institutions at the 1 and 5 per cent level, respectively.
III. Liquidity
East Asia Latin America
Variable Non-Failed M&A Non-Failed M&A
Liquid assets/Total assets 21.45 17.54* 26.08 16.62***
Liquid  assets/Total liabilities 23.48 19.15* 24.43 19.45***
*** and * indicate significant differences between non-failed and M&A financial institutions at the 1 and 10 per cent level, respectively.
IV. Profitability
East Asia Latin America
Variable Non-Failed M&A Non-Failed M&A
Return on assets 1.60 0.99*** 1.08 -0.18***
*** indicates significant differences between non-failed and M&A financial institutions at the 1 per cent level.
V. Market-Based Indicators
East Asia Latin America
Variable Non-Failed M&A Non-Failed M&A
Growth rate of deposits 16.28 17.68 13.03 14.19
Loans interest rate 14.81 12.62*** 18.62 21.98**
Deposits interest rate 8.92 9.13 9.20 8.76
Spread  6.92 7.11 11.34 13.85***
*** and ** indicate significant differences between non-failed and M&A financial institutions at the 1 and 5 per cent level, respectively.
1
 The sample of countries for East Asia includes Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and















Table E.2: Cross-Sectional Logit Estimation for East Asia 
  1 
Excluding mergers and acquisitions of the definition of failure 
(Marginal Effects) 
         2 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Loan-loss provisions/Total loans  -0.035  -0.023  -0.049 
0.460  0.638  0.335 
Total loans/Total assets  0.003  0.004  0.004 * 
0.108  0.107  0.078 
Total equity/Total assets  -0.037 *** 
0.000 
Total equity/Total liabilities  -0.030 *** 
0.000 
Total equity/(Total liabilities + Off-balance sheet)  -0.025 *** 
0.001 
Liquid assets/Total liabilities  -0.008 ***  -0.009 ***  -0.008 *** 
0.005  0.005  0.014 
Return on assets  -0.165 ***  -0.174 ***  -0.210 *** 
0.001  0.000  0.000 
Log (Total assets)  -0.099 ***  -0.102 ***  -0.210 *** 
0.007  0.006  0.008 
Regulation index  -0.116 ***  -0.119 ***  -0.125 *** 
0.000  0.000  0.000 
No. obs.  436  432  430 
Wald  Chi2  68.98  67.54  68.15 
Prob > Chi2  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Overall predicted power  76.53%  76.37%  76.03% 
*** and * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1 and 10 per cent level, 
respectively. 
1   The estimation was done including crisis (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) and non-crisis 
   (Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan) countries.  
  Bank-level bank fundamentals, including the size of the bank, are measured as of December 1996. A constant term 
  was included in the initial estimation. 
2  
 Marginal effects are reported, rather than the coefficients.  The significance level is reported in italics below the 
  marginal effects. The Z-statistics are based on robust (Huber and White) standard errors, which account for correlated  
  observations in grouped data.   44 
Table E.3: Cross-Sectional Logit Estimation for Latin America1




Loan-loss provisions/Total loans 0.022 *** 0.020 ***
0.007 0.012
Total loans/Total assets -0.001 -0.001
0.343 0.324
Total equity/Total assets -0.007 ***
0.005
Total equity/Total liabilities -0.005 ***
0.003
Liquid assets/Total liabilities -0.002 -0.001
0.263 0.283
Return on assets -0.006 -0.006
0.547 0.484
Log (Total assets) -0.001 0.000
0.929 0.996
Foreign ownership -0.071 ** -0.068 **
0.012 0.014
Regulation index 0.057 * 0.058 *
0.075 0.064
No. obs. 295 296
Wald  Chi2 32.13 30.75
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00
***, **, * indicate significant differences between failed and non-failed financial institutions at the 1, 5, and 10 per
cent level, respectively.
1  The estimation was done including crisis (Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela) and non-crisis (Chile, Colombia, and 
   Peru) countries.
  Bank-level fundamentals, including the size of the bank, are measured as of December 1993 for Venezuela, as
  of September 1994 for Argentina and Mexico, and as of December 1994 for Chile, Colombia, and Peru. A constant
  term was included in the initial estimation.
2  Marginal effects are reported, rather than the coefficients.  The significance level is reported in italics below the 
  marginal effects. The Z-statistics are based on robust (Huber and White) standard errors, which account for 
  correlated observations in grouped data.  
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Appendix F: List of Failed Banks 
 
 
In the tables in this appendix, the failure code numbers signify the following: 
 
 
1.  The financial institution (bank) was recapitalized by either the central bank or 
an agency specifically created to address the crisis, and/or it required a 
liquidity injection from the monetary authority. 
 
2.  The financial institution’s operations were temporarily suspended (“frozen”) 
by the government. 
 
3.  The government closed the financial institution. 
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Date of failure Failure code Bank name Country
Nov-97 3 Andromeda Bank INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Arya Panduarta INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Asia Pacific - ASPAC Bank INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Bahari INDONESIA
Mar-99 4 Bank Bali INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank BIRA - Bank Indonesia Raya INDONESIA
Mar-99 1 Bank Bukopin INDONESIA
Jan-98 4 Bank Bumi Daya (Persero) PT INDONESIA
Aug-98 2 Bank Central Asia INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Central Dagang INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Dagang Dan Industri INDONESIA
Jan-98 4 Bank Dagang Negara (Persero) INDONESIA
Aug-98 2 Bank Danamon Indonesia Tbk INDONESIA
Mar-99 2 Bank Duta INDONESIA
Apr-98 2 Bank Ekspor Impor Indonesia - BankExim INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank First Indonesian Finance and Investments Corporation - Ficorinvest Bank INDONESIA
Mar-99 1 Bank Internasional Indonesia Tbk INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Lautan Berlian INDONESIA
Mar-99 1 Bank Lippo Tbk. INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Mashill Utama INDONESIA
Aug-98 3 Bank Modern INDONESIA
Apr-98 2 Bank Nasional INDONESIA
Dec-98 1 Bank Negara Indonesia (Persero) - Bank BNI INDONESIA
Apr-98 2 Bank Nusa Internasional INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Papan Sejahtera INDONESIA
Dec-98 4 Bank Pembangunan Indonesia (Persero) - BAPINDO INDONESIA
Mar-99 1 Bank Prima Express INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Putra Surya Perkasa INDONESIA
Dec-98 1 Bank Rakyat Indonesia INDONESIA
Mar-99 2 Bank Rama INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Sahid Gajah Perkasa INDONESIA
Apr-98 3 Bank Subentra INDONESIA
Apr-98 3 Bank Surya INDONESIA
Aug-98 2 Bank Tiara Asia INDONESIA
Aug-98 3 Bank Umum Nasional INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Bank Umum Servitia INDONESIA
Mar-99 1 Bank Universal INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Hastin Internasional Bank INDONESIA
Mar-99 2 JayaBank International INDONESIA
Mar-99 3 Kharisma Bank INDONESIA
Mar-99 1 PT Bank Niaga Tbk INDONESIA
Nov-97 3 Sejahtera Bank Umum - Bank SBU INDONESIA
Mar-99 2 Tamara Bank INDONESIA
Apr-98 3 Bank Pelita INDONESIA
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Date of failure Failure code Bank name Country
Jan-99 4 Boram Bank KOREA REP. OF
Apr-99 4 Chohung Bank KOREA REP. OF
Jun-98 3 Chung Chong Bank Ltd. (The) KOREA REP. OF
Apr-99 4 Chungbuk Bank Ltd KOREA REP. OF
Jan-99 4 Commercial Bank of Korea KOREA REP. OF
Jun-98 3 Daedong Bank KOREA REP. OF
Jun-98 3 Donghwa Bank KOREA REP. OF
Jun-98 3 Dongnam Bank KOREA REP. OF
May-99 1 H&CB KOREA REP. OF
May-99 1 Hana Bank KOREA REP. OF
Jan-99 4 Hanil Bank KOREA REP. OF
Jun-99 1 Industrial Bank of Korea KOREA REP. OF
Sep-99 4 Kangwon Bank KOREA REP. OF
May-99 1 Kookmin Bank (Old) KOREA REP. OF
May-99 1 Koram Bank KOREA REP. OF
Jan-98 2 Korea First Bank KOREA REP. OF
Dec-98 4 Korea Long Term Credit Bank KOREA REP. OF
Jan-98 3 Kyungki Bank Ltd. KOREA REP. OF
Jan-98 2 Seoul Bank KOREA REP. OF
May-99 1 Shinhan Bank KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 Coryo Merchant Bank KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 Daehan Investment Banking Corp. KOREA REP. OF
Jun-99 1 Export-Import Bank of Korea KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 Gyongnam Merchant Banking Corporation KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 H&S Merchant Banking Corporation KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 Hansol Merchant Bank KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 Hanwha Merchant Bank KOREA REP. OF
Feb-99 4 Hyundai International Merchant Bank HIMB KOREA REP. OF
1999 4 Hyundai Securities Co. Ltd. KOREA REP. OF
Jun-99 1 Korea Development Bank KOREA REP. OF
Dec-98 4 Korea International Merchant Bank KOREA REP. OF
Jul-99 4 LG Merchant Banking Corporation - LGMB KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 Nara Banking Corporation KOREA REP. OF
Jul-99 3 National Livestock Cooperatives Federation KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 Saehan Merchant Banking Corp. KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 Samyang Merchant Bank KOREA REP. OF
Dec-97 3 Shinhan Investment Bank KOREA REP. OF
Oct-98 1 AmBank Group MALAYSIA
Jun-99 4 Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Berhad MALAYSIA
Nov-98 1 BSN Commercial Bank (Malaysia) Berhad MALAYSIA
Jun-97 4 Chung Khiaw Bank (Malaysia) Bhd MALAYSIA
Oct-98 1 Oriental Bank Berhad MALAYSIA
Nov-98 1 RHB Bank Berhad MALAYSIA
Nov-98 1 Sabah Bank Berhad MALAYSIA
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Date of failure Failure code Bank name Country
Nov-98 1 AMMB Holdings Berhad MALAYSIA
Nov-98 1 Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad MALAYSIA
Dec-99 4 BSN Merchant Bank BHD MALAYSIA
Jun-99 4 Hock Hua Finance Berhad MALAYSIA
Jan-99 4 Multi-Purpose Finance Berhad MALAYSIA
Jan-98 4 RHB Finance Berhad MALAYSIA
Nov-98 1 Southern Investment Bank Berhad MALAYSIA
1999 4 TA Enterprise Berhad MALAYSIA
Nov-98 1 United Merchant Group Bhd. MALAYSIA
Nov-98 1 Utama Merchant Bank Berhad MALAYSIA
Jun-99 4 Philippine Commercial International Bank - PCIBank PHILIPPINES
Jul-98 3 Mindanao Development Bank PHILIPPINES
Aug-98 3 Bangkok Bank of Commerce Public Company Limited THAILAND
Jan-98 2 Bangkok Metropolitan Bank Public Company Limited THAILAND
Dec-98 1 Bank of Asia Public Company Limited THAILAND
Aug-98 2 Bankthai Public Company Limited THAILAND
Jan-98 4 DBS Thai Danu Bank Public Company Limited THAILAND
Feb-98 2 First Bangkok City Bank THAILAND
Feb-98 2 Siam City Bank Public Company Limited THAILAND
Dec-98 1 Siam Commercial Bank Public Company Limited THAILAND
Apr-99 4 Standard Chartered Nakornthon Bank THAILAND
Aug-98 2 UOB Radanasin Bank Public Company Limited THAILAND
Apr-99 1 Asia Credit Public Company Limited THAILAND
Jun-97 3 CMIC Finance and Security PCL THAILAND
Aug-98 2 Dhana Siam Finance & Securities THAILAND
Jun-97 3 Finance One Public Company Limited THAILAND
Jun-97 3 General Finance and Securities Ltd. THAILAND
Aug-98 2 IFCT Finance and Securities PCL THAILAND
Jun-97 3 ITF Finance and Securities PCL THAILAND
Aug-98 4 Krungthai Thanakit PCL THAILAND
Aug-97 3 Multi-Credit Corporation of Thailand PCL THAILAND
May-98 2 Nava Finance & Securities Public Company Limited THAILAND
Aug-97 3 SCF Finance and Securities PCL THAILAND
Aug-97 3 Siam City Credit Finance and Securities PCL THAILAND
May-99 1 Siam Industrial Credit Public Company Limited (The) THAILAND
Aug-97 3 SITCA Investment and Securities PCL THAILAND
Aug-97 3 SRI Dhana Finance and Securities PCL THAILAND
Aug-97 3 Union Asia Finance Public Co. Ltd. THAILAND
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Date of failure Failure code Bank name Country
Dec-95 4 Banesto Banco Shaw ARGENTINA
Jul-96 4 Banco Popular Argentina SA ARGENTINA
Jan-97 4 Banco Frances del Rio de la Plata SA ARGENTINA
Dec-96 4 Banco Cooperativo de Caseros Limitado ARGENTINA
Jul-96 4 The Chase Manhattan Bank, NA ARGENTINA
Aug-96 4 Banco de San Juan SA ARGENTINA
Sep-96 4 Banco Tornquist SA ARGENTINA
May-95 4 Banco Cooperativo de la Plata Ltdo. ARGENTINA
Dec-97 3 Banco Credito Provincial ARGENTINA
Dec-96 4 Banco de Credito Comercial SA ARGENTINA
Feb-95 4 Banco de Entre Rios SEM ARGENTINA
Jul-96 4 Banco de la Provincia de Tucumán. ARGENTINA
Jul-95 4 Banco Monserrat SA ARGENTINA
Aug-98 4 Banco Rio de la Plata SA ARGENTINA
Aug-96 4 Banco de Prevision Social SA ARGENTINA
Nov-95 4 Banco Municipal de Parana SEMICFAI ARGENTINA
Apr-96 4 Banco Commercial del Tandil SA ARGENTINA
May-95 4 Banco Cooperativo del Este Argentino Ltdo. ARGENTINA
Mar-95 4 Banco de Coronel Dorrego SA ARGENTINA
Jul-95 4 Banco de Junin SA ARGENTINA
Nov-95 4 Banco de Olavarria SA ARGENTINA
Mar-95 4 Banco Rural (Sunchales) CL ARGENTINA
May-97 2 Nuevo Banco de Azul SA ARGENTINA
Jul-96 4 Banco Popular Financiero SA ARGENTINA
Apr-97 4 Banco Union Commercial e Industrial CL ARGENTINA
May-95 2 Banco del Noroeste CL ARGENTINA
Jul-95 3 Banco Federal Argentino ARGENTINA
Mar-96 4 Banco Interfinanzas SA ARGENTINA
Feb-95 3 ACISO Banco CL ARGENTINA
May-97 4 Banco Platense SA ARGENTINA
May-95 4 Banco San Jose CL ARGENTINA
Jul-95 4 Banco Cooperative Nicolas Levalle Ltdo ARGENTINA
Apr-95 4 Banco del Ibera SA ARGENTINA
Apr-95 4 Banco Coinag CL ARGENTINA
May-95 4 Banco Nucleo CL ARGENTINA
May-95 4 Banco de las Comunidades CL ARGENTINA
Apr-95 4 Banco Noar CL ARGENTINA
Jul-95 4 Banco Horizonte CL ARGENTINA
Jun-95 4 Banco Aliancoop CL ARGENTINA
Feb-95 4 Banco Nueva Era CL ARGENTINA
Jun-95 4 Banco VAF CL ARGENTINA
Apr-95 4 Banco Independcia CL ARGENTINA
Aug-95 3 Banco Integrado Departmental CL ARGENTINA
Jun-95 4 Banco C.E.S CL ARGENTINA
Feb-95 3 Banco de la Ribera CL ARGENTINA
Jul-95 4 Banco Meridional CL ARGENTINA
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Date of failure Failure code Bank name Country
Jun-95 4 Banco Carlos Pelligrini CL ARGENTINA
Jun-95 4 Banco Nordecoop CL ARGENTINA
Jun-95 4 Banco Local CL ARGENTINA
Mar-97 4 Banco Coopesur CL ARGENTINA
Mar-95 3 Banco Feigin SA ARGENTINA
May-95 4 Banco Asfin SA ARGENTINA
May-95 4 Banco Provencor SA ARGENTINA
Feb-97 4 Banco Liniers Sudamericano SA ARGENTINA
Feb-96 4 Banco Baires ARGENTINA
Mar-96 4 Banco UNB SA ARGENTINA
Jul-95 4 Banco Caudal SA ARGENTINA
Jul-95 4 Banco del Fuerte SA ARGENTINA
Feb-95 3 Banco Multicredito SA ARGENTINA
Apr-95 3 Banco Austral SA ARGENTINA
Nov-94 3 Banco Extrader SA ARGENTINA
Nov-96 4 Banco de la Cuenca del Plata ARGENTINA
Nov-94 4 Banco del Chaco SEM ARGENTINA
Dec-95 4 Banco de la Provincia de Formosa ARGENTINA
Jan-96 4 Banco de la Provincia de Missiones ARGENTINA
Mar-96 4 Banco de la Provincia de Rio Negro ARGENTINA
Mar-96 4 Banco Provincial de Salta. ARGENTINA
Aug-96 4 Banco de la Provincia de San Luis ARGENTINA
Sep-96 4 Banco de la Provincia de Santiago del Estero ARGENTINA
Nov-96 4 Banco de Mendoza SA ARGENTINA
1995 2-4 COMERMEX MEXICO
1995 2-4 Mexicano MEXICO
1995 2-4 M. Probursa MEXICO
1995 2-4 Centro MEXICO
1995 2-4 Confia MEXICO
1995 2-4 Banpais MEXICO
1995 2-4 Oriente MEXICO
1995 2-4 Obrero MEXICO
Jun-94 3 Maracaibo VENEZUELA
Aug-94 2 Venezuela VENEZUELA
Feb-95 1 Union VENEZUELA
Jan-94 3 Latino VENEZUELA
Jun-94 3 Metropolitano VENEZUELA
Feb-95 3 Italo Venezolano VENEZUELA
Jun-94 3 La Guaira VENEZUELA
Jun-94 3 Construccion VENEZUELA
Sep-94 2 Consolidado VENEZUELA
Jun-94 3 Bancor VENEZUELA
Dec-94 3 Progreso VENEZUELA
Feb-95 3 Principal VENEZUELA
Nov-95 3 Andino Venezolano VENEZUELA
Jun-94 3 Barinas VENEZUELA
Jun-94 3 Amazonas VENEZUELA
Feb-95 3 Profesional VENEZUELA
Jan-95 3 Empresarial VENEZUELA  
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